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Perspective




Formation of Australia’s National Drug Strategy (NDS) included an extensive 
consultation process that was open not only to community and public 
health stakeholders, but also to representatives of the tobacco and alcohol 
industries. Australia is bound by the World Health Organization Framework 
Convention on Tobacco Control, which requires governments to protect 
tobacco control measures from interference by the tobacco industry. NDS 
consultation submissions made by these conflicted industries are not publicly 
available for scrutiny. The NDS goals are at odds with the commercial agenda 
of industries that support regulatory stagnation, oppose and undermine 
effective action, ignore and distort evidence, and prioritise profits over health.
Introduction
The aim of Australia’s National Drug Strategy (NDS) since 1985 has been to 
ensure “safe, healthy and resilient Australian communities through minimising 
alcohol, tobacco and other drug-related health, social and economic harms 
among individuals, families and communities”.1 The latest NDS (2016–2025) 
highlights the importance of measures to reduce both demand and supply 
in minimising social and economic harms caused by use of alcohol, tobacco 
and other drugs. Comprehensive approaches, including taxation, government 
regulation, education and treatment, are essential to achieving these 
objectives.
Development of the latest NDS included an extensive consultation process 
that involved a range of health and community stakeholders, and other 
interested parties. These included representatives of the tobacco and alcohol 
industries, who were free to participate by making submissions. Although the 
NDS consultation document notes that such industry participation “is critical 
to supply reduction efforts”1, unlike other similar government processes, 
neither a list of people and organisations making submissions nor the 
submissions themselves were made public.
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• Submissions made to the National Drug 
Strategy consultation by the alcohol 
and tobacco industries are not publicly 
available for scrutiny
• Commercial bodies that profit from the 
sale of addictive and harmful products 
promote policies that serve their own 
interests, rather than those proven to be 
most effective in reducing harm
• The alcohol and tobacco industries 
should have no role in assisting 
government planning to reduce 
the burden of disease caused by 
their products
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Discussion
Information acquired through a freedom of information 
request posted on the Australian Government Department 
of Health website2 indicates that submissions were 
received from industry members, including the tobacco 
company Philip Morris Ltd, four alcohol industry bodies 
(the Australian Wine Research Institute, the Winemakers’ 
Federation of Australia, the Brewers Association of 
Australia & New Zealand, and the Australian Liquor 
Stores Association), beer industry sales leader Carlton 
& United Breweries, and the alcohol industry–funded 
organisation DrinkWise. 
Commercial interests of tobacco and alcohol 
corporations to maximise profits mean that they are 
effectively required to oppose public health measures that 
would affect their bottom lines.3 
This raises the question of why representatives of 
addictive industries – whose commercial interests are 
diametrically opposed to the aims and objectives of 
public health – are given equal standing with others in 
contributing to governmental policy processes aimed 
at minimising the harm caused by their products. As 
the NDS consultation document notes, 15 000 deaths 
each year result from tobacco use, and 3000 deaths 
and 65 000 hospitalisations were attributable to alcohol 
consumption in 2004–05. Combined costs to Australia in 
2004–05 were $46.8 billion – 83.5% of the total cost to the 
nation of all drug use in the country.1 
Australia is bound by Article 5.3 of the World Health 
Organization Framework Convention on Tobacco Control 
(FCTC), which requires governments to protect tobacco 
control measures from interference from “commercial and 
other vested interests of the tobacco industry”. There is 
a strong global history of the tobacco industry exercising 
undue influence on governments, resulting in weak and 
delayed tobacco control policy reforms.4 Allowing the 
tobacco industry to participate in government processes 
– in this case through a closed submission to the NDS 
consultation process – could possibly be in violation of 
the FCTC. 
At a minimum, any submissions made by industries 
with a clear conflict of interest in formulating a strong NDS 
should be made publicly available. This would allow civil 
society to access arguments presented by those with 
commercial interests, and to effectively monitor whether 
governments have prioritised the commercial concerns of 
industry over protecting public health. This is especially 
important because industry has access to vastly greater 
financial resources, lawyers and consultants to help 
it prepare influential submissions. Further, tobacco 
industry strategies to mislead governments and provide 
deceptive information about virtually all aspects of 
tobacco and tobacco control are well documented.5 If 
industry submissions are not in the public arena, there 
may be no capacity for health experts to analyse and 
respond, and public policy may be made on the basis of 
misleading information.
A more appropriate and effective approach would 
be to prevent these industries from influencing the 
formulation and development of public health policies and 
programs. Strategies favoured by conflicted industries, 
such as self-regulation and public–private partnerships, 
are globally recognised as weak and unproven in 
protecting public health. Commercial bodies that profit 
from the sale of addictive and harmful products will 
inevitably promote policies that serve their own interests, 
rather than give sound advice on how best to reduce the 
use of these products. 
Conclusion
In Australia, any industry can participate in democratic 
processes, and provide comment and information as 
required by governments. There is no benefit to be 
gained by permitting the alcohol and tobacco industries 
to assist government planning to reduce the burden 
of disease caused by their products. As noted in a 
prominent 2013 Lancet article, “unhealthy commodity 
industries should have no role in the formation of ... non-
communicable disease policy”.6
The NDS process must be objective, based on 
the best available evidence, untainted by vested 
interests, consistent with Australia’s international treaty 
commitments and – above all – focused on the health 
of the community. This is at odds with a commercial 
agenda that supports regulatory stagnation, opposes 
and undermines effective action, ignores and distorts 
evidence, and prioritises profits over health.
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